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Past reform to increase coordination of  regional activities 
while retaining representation of  the interests of  local 
ratepayers has often had the appearance of  closing the barn 
door after the horse has bolted.1 Will it be any different this 
time?
The struggle for regional government in Auckland
The 1966 Encyclopaedia of  New Zealand had some quite 
interesting things to say about the future of  local government. 
In a brief  article it noted the disjunction between rapidly 
growing urban areas, like Auckland, and their fragmented 
local government systems, resulting in problems of  planning, 
coordination and the execution of  regional works and 
services. 
The writers of  this particular article spoke with optimism 
about the recent passage of  a local bill to establish a 
regional local authority in the Auckland urban area and 
suggested that this might signal the future direction of  local 
government reform, namely a regional council exercising 
‘powers and functions of  a regional nature, including the 
functions performed by special-purpose authorities, while 
the territorial authorities remain in existence to perform 
purely local functions’ (Crompton and Williamson, 1966). 
Graham Bush’s excellent history of  the Auckland local 
authorities, prepared for the 2009 Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance, notes that the passage of  this bill 
was not smooth and that while the new authority was given 
nine distinct regional functions, this was less than what the 
originators of  the bill, such as mayor Dove-Myer Robinson, 
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Governing fast-growing metropolitan areas is always difficult, and the history 
of  Auckland governance is no exception. This is so for no other reason 
than the fact that they keep growing: as population increases the alignment 
of  urban and jurisdictional boundaries breaks down, creating problems of  
coordination and fragmenting decision making. In addition, the increasingly 
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describe as spillovers, where peri-urban councils benefit from the expenditure 
of  their larger neighbours while areas further out question the local benefits 
of  centrally-based facilities. Consider, for example, the debate over the 
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were looking for. Nevertheless, it was a radical measure 
and a vast improvement on what went before. There were 
31 territorial authorities within the new Auckland region, a 
number that did not change significantly until the reforms 
of  1988–89.
A range of  models exists for governing large metropolitan 
areas. The formation of  the Auckland Regional Authority 
represented a ‘two-tier’ approach. In this model, local 
councils tend to be responsible for truly local services, such 
as parks, libraries, neighbourhood improvements and local 
streets, while matters that cross local boundaries, such as 
the network infrastructures and planning, are undertaken 
by some form of  regional authority, which might be directly 
elected or might have its membership appointed by the local 
councils. 
The reforms of  the fourth Labour government in 1989, 
which strengthened the regional authority and rationalised 
the 31 local councils – replacing them with eight – probably 
gave Auckland its best chance to get its governance structure 
in line with the demands of  a fast-growing city. The new 
model, however, had a very short life span. In his column 
in the New Zealand Herald of  15 April 2009 Brian Rudman 
sought to identify those responsible for disabling Auckland’s 
nascent regional governance model and creating the complex, 
fragmented governing arrangement that is Auckland today. 
As Rudman notes:
It’s forgotten now, but if  we’d stuck with the model the 
Local Government Commission proposed in 1989 we 
mightn’t be going through the current upheavals. … 
National’s Local Government Minister Warren Cooper 
feared a strong Auckland, and emasculated the proposed 
strong regional council.
So it is probably appropriate that the current National 
government has the job of  putting right the problems that 
have resulted from the actions of  one of  its party’s ministers 
16 years ago. The Local Government Amendment Act 
1992 limited the role of  regional councils to environmental 
management and regulation, with few exceptions, and 
continued a policy that tended to treat all regions much 
the same, whether they were large and sparsely settled 
like the West Coast of  the South Island or a large urban 
conglomeration.2 
The background to the royal commission
The suggestion that the governance of  Auckland represented a 
‘problem’ that warranted some form of  national intervention 
(rather than simply a change of  personnel) became a driving 
narrative through the early part of  this decade. Against a 
background of  infrastructure crises – such as power blackouts 
and the fragility of  supply, congestion and the failure to 
complete the national and local highway system, chronic 
under-investment in sewage and storm water infrastructure 
in the older parts of  the city, and the apparent ever-increasing 
cost of  dealing with these problems – many interested parties 
were calling for change. During this period there were a 
number of  ‘game-breaking’ events, such as the first regional 
council rates revolt, which resulted in a regional council 
reluctant to move beyond a fairly narrow conception of  its 
role.3 However, the turning point was probably the failure of  
Auckland authorities to respond to the government’s offer to 
fund a waterfront stadium. While the stadium debate ended 
up as something of  a debacle, for both parties the recognition 
that Auckland would not advance without the ability to speak 
with a unified voice gained traction. 
The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance was 
established by the Labour government in 2007. Its task was 
to examine Auckland’s governance structure and report back 
after the 2008 general election. The three commissioners 
were Peter Salmond, a retired High Court judge; Dame 
Margaret Bazley, former chief  executive of  the Ministry of  
Social Policy; and David Shand, who brought an extensive 
public finance background and had previously chaired the 
Local Government Rates Inquiry. 
The report
The commissioners reported to the governor-general nearly 
a week earlier than their extended deadline of  31 March. 
Their recommendations appear to have been a tightly 
guarded secret and both the prime minister and the minister 
of  local government publicly denied any advance knowledge. 
Despite widespread speculation about the content of  the 
report, the royal commission came up with a governance 
model that was relatively unique: a unitary authority focused 
on regional and strategic matters, with six subsidiary councils 
responsible for local service delivery. Key recommendations 
were:
• the creation of  a unitary authority, to be called the Auckland 
Council, to assume all local government responsibilities 
for the Auckland region and include Rodney District 
Council, North Shore City Council, Waitakere City 
Council, Auckland City Council, Manukau City Council, 
Papakura District Council, Franklin District Council and 
Auckland Regional Council;
• the Auckland Council should operate and have 
representation at two levels: the elected Auckland Council 
and six local councils;
• the staff  from the eight abolished councils should be 
transferred to the Auckland Council, at least initially;
• the Auckland Council should include a vision for the 
region in its spatial plan and the mayor of  Auckland’s 
annual ‘State of  the region’ address should describe 
progress towards the attainment of  the vision;
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• the Auckland Council should adopt a comprehensive 
regional economic development plan and … a high-level, 
regional cross-sectoral board, comprising representatives 
of  central government, local councils, business, education 
and not-for-profit organisations;
• a Social Issues Board should be established as the main 
governance body for social issues, with central government 
membership. This board should develop a social well-
being strategy and an implementation/funding plan;
• the Social Issues Board should be supported by a social 
issues advisory group of  officials, co-funded by central 
and local government;
• the government should give consideration to aligning 
geographic boundaries of  local government and central 
government agencies responsible for the delivery of  social 
well-being services;
• the Auckland Council should comprise 23 councillors, 
including 10 councillors elected at large, 10 elected from 
wards, two councillors elected at large by voters on the 
Mäori elected roll and one councillor appointed by the 
Mana Whenua Forum; and
• the government should enter into a partnership agreement 
with the Auckland Council and appoint a senior Cabinet 
minister as minister for Auckland; in addition it should 
appoint a Cabinet committee for Auckland comprising 
ministers with portfolios of  significance to Auckland. The 
Cabinet committee should be supported by an officials’ 
committee.
The royal commission’s task was to design a governance 
structure that would make Auckland an internationally 
competitive city. In doing this it has offered an entirely new 
model of  local government, one that shifts the locus of  
decision making from our traditional top-down centralised 
model to more of  a partnership approach. If  adopted by the 
government it would represent a significant change in the 
manner in which public policy decisions about localities are 
made. As the commission notes: ‘[we have] concluded that a 
fundamental rebalancing of  the relationship is required. First, 
[the report] proposes a new, stronger relationship between 
central and Auckland government’ (Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance, 2009, p.46).
Throughout their recommendations one of  the dominant 
themes is the need for a more integrated approach across the 
four well-being areas: social, economic, environmental and 
cultural.
A critical part of  the commission’s plan for Auckland is 
the establishment of  six local councils. These councils, which 
would have no ability to employ staff  or set rates and charges, 
are intended to focus on local engagement and the delivery 
of  ‘quality’ local services. These are services which are 
important locally but have limited or no regional significance, 
such as local roads: local regulatory responsibilities, including 
dogs, gaming and liquor; building consents; recreation 
centres; crime prevention; local art galleries; and delegated 
responsibilities which may include libraries, swimming pools 
and housing. In fact, this list includes the majority of  activities 
that territorial councils currently undertake.  
By defining the local councils’ operational role the 
commission has sought to ensure that the Auckland Council 
will be able to focus on the strategic challenges facing the 
region as a whole, without the distractions that councils 
currently face (think policy on dog control). The Auckland 
Council’s proposed roles are: regional and district planning; 
infrastructure planning and investment (public transport, 
roads, water and waste water); economic and social 
development; and environmental protection. It is important 
to note that some of  these functions, such as the water and 
waste water functions, are to be carried out by council-
controlled organisations. Placing them at arms’ length is 
meant to enable them to focus solely on their key objective 
and further free the council to focus on its strategic planning 
and engagement roles; however, it also removes some of  
the key ‘shaping’ levers from direct political control and 
potentially creates another form of  fragmented governance. 
The thinking behind the commission’s recommendations
The commission itself  identified a number of  problems with 
the existing governance of  Auckland:
• Public transport is poor.
• Roads are congested.
• Planning applications are slow and expensive.
• Rates are high.
• Councils fail to agree on issues important to the region.
• Councils do not listen to the people.
• The city and waterfront are run down and unattractive. 
Underpinning these practical problems, the commission 
identified two systemic issues: that regional governance is 
weak and fragmented, and community engagement is poor. 
A sceptic might suggest that other than the fragmented and 
weak regional leadership, the issues identified have little 
relevance to the question of  whether Auckland is a single 
city or not – solutions are unlikely to be found in structural 
change alone. In fact, all the international evidence suggests 
that one large city will be less attentive to citizen concerns, 
have fewer incentives to provide responsive and speedy 
services, and will be more expensive to run (McKinley, 2006). 
At least with multiple cities citizens have the opportunity to 
compare service standards.4 
The commission’s plan for Auckland represents a very 
different model of  local government to what New Zealand 
A sceptic might suggest that other than the fragmented and weak regional 
leadership, the issues identified have little relevance to the question of 
whether Auckland is a single city or not...
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Noting the importance of having the new governance structure in place in 
time for the 2010 elections and the Rugby World Cup the following year, haste 
seemed the order of the day. 
has become accustomed to. In thinking about the role of  the 
local councils, the commission is indebted to Michael Lyons’ 
major report on local government (Lyons, 2007) and his 
depiction of  ‘place shaping’ as the primary local government 
role. Examples of  place shaping include:
• building and shaping local identity;
• representing the community; 
• regulating harmful and disruptive behaviours;
• maintaining the cohesiveness of  the community and 
ensuring smaller voices are heard;
• understanding the local needs and preferences and 
making sure that the right services are provided to local 
people;
• working with other bodies in response to complex 
challenges such as natural disasters;
• promoting acceptance of  diversity and encouraging 
celebration of  that diversity.
Lyons’ work presages a wider debate that tends to 
focus more on local governance as a process than on local 
government as a set of  institutions. Councils as arbiters 
of  local governance are more concerned with steering the 
multiplicity of  local organisations towards common, citizen-
identified goals. With this democratic mandate councils have 
a crucial role in bringing together the various sectors which 
contribute to the achievement of  city-wide outcomes. Robin 
Hambleton, who wrote an influential background paper 
for the commission (Hambleton, 2009), described this in 
terms of  civic leadership. Civic leadership brings together 
political, managerial and community leaders. As exemplars, 
Hambleton pointed to the example of  local government 
leaders like the present mayor of  Chicago, who is widely 
credited with changing the fortunes of  that city through 
strong and facilitative leadership. 
As noted earlier, the commission’s model aims for more 
integration across all levels of  government. The Social Issues 
Board, for example, would be responsible for overseeing the 
expenditure of  government funding in Auckland city. In other 
words, it would challenge the current top-down approach 
to the allocation of  government resources by providing 
a mechanism for local voices to influence prioritisation of  
central government activity as well as local government input. 
In this it resembles recent legislation in the United Kingdom, 
the Sustainable Communities Act 2007, which requires the 
secretary of  state to prepare ‘local spending reports’ that 
detail what certain departments spend in council areas. In 
addition, councils and their communities are able to submit 
(via the Local Government Association) proposals that would 
improve the sustainability of  their community. The British 
government described this as ‘the principle that local people 
know best what needs to be done to promote sustainability in 
an area’ (Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.4)
The government’s response
The report was released to the public within days and early 
commentary tended to focus on the electoral structure of  
the Auckland Council (only the very rich would be able to 
stand) and the loss of  local representation with the removal 
of  the community boards. North Shore city councillor Ken 
McKay captured many of  the sentiments when he stated 
that ‘the Auckland Council would be too big and too easily 
controlled by a small group with hidden agendas’ (North	Shore	
Times, 14 April 2009). Within days grass roots organisations 
were organising to oppose what they saw as a loss of  local 
representation, a concern the government appeared to be 
very responsive to – it is probably no coincidence that before 
the week was out the minister of  local government was 
photographed mixing with local residents in Devonport and 
meeting with the chair of  the local community board.
The government’s response was rapid. Within two weeks, 
under the title Making Auckland Greater: greater communities; greater 
connections; greater value (New Zealand Government, 2009), it 
provided the new blueprint of  Auckland governance. Noting 
the importance of  having the new governance structure in 
place in time for the 2010 elections and the Rugby World 
Cup the following year, haste seemed the order of  the 
day. Further consultation, other than the select committee 
process, was not an option, and debate continues about the 
degree to which the government has acted in accordance 
with the royal commission or has substantially departed. Key 
differences include:
• removal of  the commission’s recommendation for three 
Mäori seats and a reduction in the number of  members 
elected on an at large basis: only eight members are to be 
elected from at large, plus the mayor;
• instead of  the six local councils, between 20 and 30 local 
boards; while the functions of  these boards have yet to be 
defined, the actual number and boundaries will be left to 
the Local Government Commission to determine;
• rejection of  the call for a four-year term;
• rejection of  the proposed Social Issues Board, minister 
for Auckland and Cabinet committee on Auckland; and
• adoption of  a much faster transition process.
Much of  the detail will not be known until the legislation 
has been drafted. The first decision will be forming the 
establishment board, and legislation putting this into effect is 
expected under urgency in May.
Implications
Given that the government’s proposals represent the biggest 
change to Auckland’s governance since the removal of  the 
provinces in the mid-1870s, it is not surprising that it has 
become controversial. While the royal commission took 18 
months to develop its proposal, the government essentially 
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took a week and has presented a model which is extremely 
underdone.5 Questions about the feasibility of  the new 
structure are unlikely to die down until more detail emerges 
in a draft bill later this year. 
Much of  the local dissent is fueled by the perception 
that the plan represents a major diminution of  citizens’ 
democratic rights. Critics point to changes in representation 
ratios. For example, Tony Holman, a North Shore city 
councillor, notes that the proposed representation ratio will 
be 1:63,636, compared to Dunedin, for example, which 
has a representation ration of  1:8,750 (New Zealand Herald, 
6 April 2009, p.11). Representation ratios are important 
as they signify the degree to which an elected member or 
politician is able to adequately represent and take note of  
the concerns and issues of  citizens. Citizens look to their 
local or ward councillor to address issues with council 
performance and act as their voice around the council table. 
Likewise, an effective councillor will hold regular meetings 
in their ward to keep up to date with local issues. As ratios 
increase, physical limits restrict individual councillors’ ability 
to meet community expectations and decrease their ability to 
understand and monitor what management does. There is 
also some international evidence that as representation ratios 
increase voter turnout decreases (Drage, 2008). 
The government’s answer to these criticisms is to point 
to the planned 20–30 local boards and to assure critics that 
they will have greater decision-making power than existing 
community boards (although less than the existing councils). 
Getting the design right will not be easy. The local boards 
are expected to provide ‘representation at a grassroots level 
and [ensure] that individuals have a voice’ (New Zealand 
Government, 2009, p.14). The government suggests that 
these boards will advocate, develop local operational policies 
such as on dog control and liquor licensing, and will have 
the ability to petition the Auckland Council for extra services 
which might be paid for by some form of  local targeted rate. 
It is unfortunate that the government has not been more 
specific about the likely functions of  these boards, as more 
information could have gone a long way towards answering 
the fears of  the critics. As it is, suggesting that graffiti control 
and dog policy could be examples of  local decision making 
will have the opposite effect. Both services are operated by 
staff  under delegation and it is unlikely that the government 
envisages Auckland having up to 30 different dog control 
policies.6 
To get an idea of  what the local boards might do and 
whether they will ensure that residents continue to have 
a say on local matters, it might be useful to look at the 
way community boards currently operate elsewhere. 
Approximately 45 councils have community boards, and while 
the Local Government Amendment Act 2002 establishes 
a minimalist role, many councils have provided them with 
additional delegated powers. Arguably the most relevant 
model is Christchurch city, which has six urban community 
boards covering the whole of  the urban area. A brief  scan of  
their monthly order papers shows that the boards are actively 
involved in making decisions about local roads, on issues 
like traffic calming and the location of  pedestrian crossings. 
In fact, they generally manage or have an input into most 
neighbourhood issues, including community centres, local 
parks and community development. Each board is provided 
with an annual budget, 90% of  which is for ‘internal 
purchasing’ – often used to bring forward planned investment 
by a council department. While Christchurch has developed 
an effective governance model with six (now eight following 
the absorption of  Banks Peninsula) community boards, it will 
be a much more complex challenge attempting to coordinate 
up to 30 boards, which might be the outcome in Auckland. 
This detail won’t emerge until well into the legislative drafting 
stage.
So far little has been said publicly about the decision 
to set up arms’-length organisations to manage some of  
the city’s major activities, a decision which on first reading 
appears to negate the goal to provide for a more integrated 
approach. For example, there is to be a stand-alone regional 
economic development agency, a stand-alone regional 
transport authority and a stand-alone water and waste water 
agency. These might be sensible ideas, but generally we leave 
decisions of  this sort up to councils themselves to determine, 
and if  these strategic decisions are being managed by stand-
alone agencies this calls into question the need to also change 
other governance arrangements. Parliament is not well placed 
to make these decisions and by putting them into statute 
flexibility is lost and it is almost inevitable that the question 
of  how these organisations operate and work together will 
be back before Parliament at some point in the future. Our 
experience with local government legislation suggests that 
less prescription is better than more.
Conclusion
Until the detail of  the government’s new plan emerges 
it will find itself  on the defensive, as it cannot provide the 
detail critics are looking for. Wisely, it has already begun 
to back off  from any suggestion that the new council will 
cost Auckland ratepayers less. International research 
suggests that these consolidations seldom achieve the savings 
reformers expect, and of  course the royal commission had 
considered the government’s plan and judged it impractical. 
The commission’s primary concern with the idea of  20–30 
local boards was that they ‘would be too small to have the 
It may not be cheaper and it is unlikely to be as responsive, but it will have 
the capacity to speak with one voice and this appears to be the government’s 
overriding objective, one that is seen to be of national significance. 
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capacity to deliver the necessary services’ (Royal Commission 
on Auckland Governance, 2009, p.319). However, reading 
between the lines, they were mostly concerned that the 
Auckland Council might be distracted by the minutiae of  
operational policy and thus fail to focus on the strategic issues 
facing the city. 
Change itself  is not costless.7 The cost of  the reorganisation 
has been suggested as at least $113 million, the majority of  
which will be funded by the ratepayers, and nothing has so far 
been said about the loss of  managerial and political capital. 
While other councils in New Zealand are already doing their 
best to entice Auckland staff  to experience the pleasures of, 
for example, the Southern Alps, what about political capital? 
Auckland has a very competent and experienced cadre of  
politicians. Over two, three or more terms these are people 
who have not only learned how Auckland as a city works but 
have also learnt their political trade inside local authorities. 
They know how to develop policy, manage management 
and engage with citizens. While the royal commission’s 
model continued to offer them a future, it is unlikely that the 
government’s new proposal will be as attractive. Their loss 
will be Auckland’s loss and maybe New Zealand’s. It is likely 
that the local boards will be seen as a demotion to a low-level 
figurehead role; however, this will ultimately depend on the 
boards’ level of  decision making and the degree to which 
they are adequately supported and advised by staff.
The short answer to the question posed at the start of  
this article is ‘yes’: solving the governance problems of  large 
cities has always been difficult and this is unlikely to change. 
Ultimately it involves a trade-off  between our values of  
democracy and efficiency, between smaller organisations 
that are responsive to their citizen ratepayers and large 
organisations that can think and act strategically. The new 
Auckland governance model will work in some respects. It 
may not be cheaper and it is unlikely to be as responsive, 
but it will have the capacity to speak with one voice and this 
appears to be the government’s overriding objective, one that 
is seen to be of  national significance. The challenge facing the 
legislators is to find the balance between giving the proposed 
local boards sufficient decision-making powers to satisfy 
local cities and attract talented politicians while allowing 
the Auckland Council to focus on the issues that count. 
However, I can’t help feeling that they might have missed 
an opportunity to have achieved something a bit better. The 
royal commission’s plan for Auckland may not have been 
the right plan, but at least it was a coherent and logical one. 
It probably deserved a more thorough investigation than it 
received.
1 The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance has attempted to solve this by pushing 
the city’s boundaries well into the rural hinterlands of Rodney and Franklin. If Auckland city 
managed to use up this proposed envelop I suspect we would all have concern to worry.
2 For example, Auckland Regional Council and the Greater Wellington Regional Council were 
allowed to run regional parks, and Greater Wellington remained the region’s bulk water 
provider.
3 For example, the Auckland Regional Amenities Funding Act 2008 required the territorial 
councils to fund 12 different regional organisations, such as surf life saving and 
the regional orchestra. The logic suggests that the regional council should have this 
responsibility, as it can rate regionally. Its reluctance forced Parliament to impose a levy on 
all territorial councils and provided legislators with further evidence of governance failure.
4 While the average rate varies considerably between the Auckland councils, most 
Aucklanders face average rates bills little different from residents in most other cities and 
districts. An equally convincing argument can be mounted that Auckland rates have been 
too low to enable councils to properly maintain their infrastructure and invest in growth, 
leading to the current infrastructural deficit.
5 The government has argued (Wayne Mapp, New Zealand Herald, 7 April 2009, p.2) that 
the royal commission undertook an extensive consultation process. Therefore, it is under 
no obligation to consult further or hold a referendum (the norm when local governance 
arrangements are changed). However, Rod Oram writing in the Sunday Star Times on 
12 April 2009 argues that the government’s approach has changed the commission’s 
proposals to such a degree that it is essentially a different model.
6 In what is probably an unwelcome contribution, the former minister of local government 
Michael Bassett, who was responsible for the establishment of community boards in 1989, 
informed the Sunday Star Times that they were ‘a waste of time’ and tended to create work 
for themselves (Sunday Star Times, 12 April 2009, p.4).
7 See Owen McShane (National Business Review, 17 April 2009) for a discussion on the 
disruption costs.
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